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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies the electricity industry network in Pakistan, particularly in the 
context of structural and regulatory reforms started in the 1990s. Published reports by the 
regulator show that the reforms process is not going anywhere even after two decades and 
the industry is performing poorly [NEPRA1 (2010)]. The market is not clearing as load 
demand is higher than total system supply, particularly during the summer season.2  
There is no electricity, due to load shedding, for long hours in major parts of country 
served by the distribution networks during the hot and long summer period. An effort is 
made here to document the basic facts of industry in an orderly manner and to draw 
major lessons from the failure of the reforms process and poor functioning of the 
electricity market. The focus will be on the electricity supply chain networks and issues 
in the regulation of the electricity industry.  The restructuring of the natural monopoly 
components of industry will be discussed in detail.   
The electricity industry in Pakistan is quite under researched [Pakistan (2013)], the 
main source of industry knowledge is based on government publications. According to 
available research [NEPRA (2011), Malik (2007)], the rich information provided in 
policy documents and regulatory reports has not been analysed in detail. Therefore, 
documenting basic industry facts and related issues in this paper is a contribution to the 
existing literature and will be useful for future policy reforms. 
The electricity industry in Pakistan has been functioning as a state monopoly for a 
long time. The state monopoly includes two vertically integrated electric utilities in the 
country; the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) with a customer base 
of 20.3 million and the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC) serving 2.1 million 
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List of abbreviations and acronyms is provided in the Appendix Table 3A. 
2
There are no official figures available on load shedding hours. The summer season runs from April to 
October in most parts of the country. 
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customers.3 In the last two decades, two major changes have occurred in the electricity 
industry of Pakistan. First, the two state owned utilities went through structural reforms 
and unbundling in 2002. Second, regulation of the electricity industry started in 1998 and 
an authority was put in place to regulate electricity prices, allow entry into the industry 
and set standards for the electricity supply. The reforms were motivated by the intuition 
that state owned monopolies were less efficient than private enterprises and there was a 
need to either privatise or restructure state entities. The unbundling process included 
separation of the potentially competitive segment (i.e. power generation) from the 
network based natural monopoly of the electricity industry (i.e. transmission, and 
distribution of power), and division of the natural monopoly part of industry into 
transmission and distribution networks. The network components of industry are subject 
to regulation, and distribution utilities also perform as retail electricity suppliers.  
The restructuring plan for the state-owned power sector was approved by the 
government of Pakistan in 1992, however the first substantial change in the industry was the 
commissioning of independent power producers (IPPs) in 1994. The IPPs started supplying 
electricity to the system in the late 1990s, and this was followed by privatisation of a public 
power plant in 1996. These early initiatives created political debate and legal disputes between 
government and IPPs due to the lack of transparency in contractual arrangements and no 
obvious change in the competitive structure of the generation segment.   
The regulation of the industry started in 1998 when the National Electric Power 
Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) was put in place to regulate price, quality, and entry in 
the industry. NEPRA issued licences to 9 distribution companies (DISCOs) in 2002, 
including 8 companies in the WAPDA system. A licence was also issued to the National 
Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC)4 for the transmission business in the 
WAPDA system. The 8 distribution companies and the NTDC are working as 
government owned monopolies in the distribution and transmission network of WAPDA 
served areas, structure of the industry is presented in Figure 1. 
The electricity industry in Pakistan is plagued by financial and operational issues 
which are affecting the economic efficiency and growth of the industry [Pakistan (2013)]. 
The distribution companies and the transmission company rely on large and recurrent 
public subsidy5, 1,290 billion Rupees6 have been transferred as subsidies to DISCOs from 
2007 to 2012 [Pakistan (2013)]. The regulator decides the electricity price for each utility 
(i.e. a DISCO) after taking into account the consumer mix, transmission losses and 
operational cost of the DISCOs in accordance with the tariff standards and procedure 
rules [NEPR (2011)]. The government determines the final electricity price, which is 
lower than the price determined by regulators for most utilities. Therefore central 
government does not pass all of the electricity supply costs to consumers by charging less 
 
3
In the year 2011, 90 percent power generation (91,663 GW h) was done by WAPDA system while 10 
percent (10,036GW h) in KESC system [NEPRA (2011)]. 
4
This paper covers transmission and distribution networks of WAPDA system, KESC is a vertically 
integrated company operational in the greater Karachi region (with no effective separate cost centres) and issues 
related to KESC might need a different framework for discussion. However, possible experiment can be done to 
compare performance of KESC with government owned distribution companies. 
5
The issues related to network part of the industry are discussed here in detail, as the focus is on the 
distribution and transmission segments of the industry in WAPDA/NTDC system. 
6
about 18 billion US dollars. 
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than the tariffs determined by the regulator to promote economic development7. The 
government introduced price differential subsidies in order to pursue the policy of 
uniform electricity prices in the country. In this way the performance incentives for firms 
in power networks can be partially determined by the subsidy allocation mechanism and 
regulatory tariff structure. 
The main objective of this paper is to present an account of the network of the 
electricity industry and analyse the transition from state monopoly to a regulated state 
monopoly. An effort is made to highlight the factors which are potentially slowing 
growth of the industry and resulting in poor allocation of resources. The documentation 
of technical, economic, and institutional factors related to transmission and distribution 
segments is an integral part of understanding market functioning and incentive structure 
in the electricity industry [Joskow and Schmalensee (1983)]. The economic efficiency in 
the electricity industry also depends on the contractual nature and consequent incentives 
in network economy, and the tariff incentive structure applicable to utilities (DISCOs) 
and system operator (NTDC). The current tariff structure and evolution to its current state 
is discussed here, with respect to corresponding implications for incentives for firms in 
the business of electricity networks. 
The electricity networks are an important component of the electricity industry, 
efficient functioning of transmission and distribution companies and timely capital 
investment in distribution networks is required for the growth of other segments of the 
industry. For instance, the power generation segment performance will depend on the 
reliability and structure of the transmission and distribution networks. The missing 
interconnection of transmission networks or inadequate capacity in the networks affects 
the operation of existing power plants and has delayed the commissioning of new power 
generation plants [NEPRA (2010)].  
The analysis of incentive mechanism for the electricity networks assumes the 
separation of network segments into clearly defined distribution and transmission 
networks [Joskow (2008)]. Although the unbundling of electric power in WAPDA 
system occurred in 2002 with the establishment of distribution companies DISCOs and 
transmission company NTDC, however formal contractual relationships between 
DISCOs and NTDC are not in place and they were under “de facto” common 
management until recently [NEPRA (2011)]. The role of key public institutions8 during 
transition needs to be discussed in order to understand the incentive structure and 
resulting behaviour of DISCOs and NTDC (see Figure 1 for structure of the Industry). 
The electricity networks in the main system are government owned regulated monopolies 
where the authority (i.e. NEPRA) oversees the regulation and determines tariffs for the 
electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. The knowledge about regulatory 
effectiveness and incentives creation by tariff structure or regulator lag is quite limited 
for Pakistan [Malik (2007)]. The documentation of all the institutional details with 
potential economic consequences for the electricity industry will be useful for the future 
reforms of the electricity industry in Pakistan.  
 
7
Government documents show that electricity sale price for all utilities is equal to the lowest 
determined price for any utility (among all utilities) for a given year [Pakistan (2013)]. 
8One example, Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO), PEPCO’s main responsibilities included to 
oversee WAPDA’s unbundling, and to restructure and to corporatise distribution and generation public firms 
[NEPRA (2010)]. 
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The following discussion in this paper is divided into four sections, the next section 
discusses issues related to the structure and management of electricity distribution 
networks, the natural monopoly role of electricity networks and its implications for 
economic efficiency are also analysed in this part. The Section 3 documents incentive 
regulation particularly relevant to electricity networks and compares it with current practice 
in Pakistan. The Section 4 expands discussion to the public sector role in the power industry 
particularly in electricity networks and incentive mechanisms for market based reforms. 
Some policy recommendations based on analysis and concluding remarks are documented 
in the last section. Additional tables and list of abbreviations are given in the appendices. 
 
2.  STRUCTURE OF ELECTRICITY NETWORKS 
In this section we will discuss the implications of “electricity network” structure 
for economic efficiency of the electricity systems in the context of theoretical 
considerations and general practice in the electricity industry. The distribution networks 
operator also plays the role of retail business in Pakistan, the issues related to the quality 
of electricity supply are also documented in this section. The structure of electricity 
networks is considered as a regulated natural monopoly like gas or water supply 
networks, where duplication cost can be avoided by serving a geographical market with a 
single transmission or distribution company, instead of more than one firm doing the 
same job [Joskow and Schmalensee (1983)]. Transmission networks carry high voltage 
power and connect a generator to other generators and the load centres in the system, 
while the distribution networks supply electricity on low voltage to consumers and are 
connected to high voltage transmission networks through boundary grid stations.  
In Pakistan, government owned distribution companies DISCOs and system 
operator NTDC are functioning as distribution and transmission monopolies respectively, 
while government owned generation companies (GENCOs) are competing with private 
power producers to supply electricity in the system (Figure 1 below). This structure of 
industry shown in Figure 1 requires explanation of the past institutional context. 
 
Fig. 1.  The Unbundled Structure of the Vertically Integrated State Monopoly 
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Historically, utilities in Pakistan were vertically integrated in their generation, 
transmission and distribution9 businesses. Incentives for vertical integration of 
distribution with generation-transmission arise due to some basic complementarities. The 
distribution networks are load centres and they provide reliable load forecast to 
generation and transmission firms for the efficient functioning of the electricity system. 
The accurate load forecasts are also necessary for short term planning and long term 
investments in a generation-transmission system [Joskow and Schmalensee (1983)].  
The distribution and transmission networks were part of vertically integrated state-
monopoly Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). As a result of 
WAPDA’s restructuring in 2002, the regulator issued licences to distribution companies 
DISCOs and transmission company NTDC to work as unbundled natural monopolies. 
Further, Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO) was formed to manage the 
unbundling process and to make sure that electricity networks make a successful 
transition. However, centralisation incentive persisted with central government in guise 
of NTDC/PEPCO as the current system is without any effective contractual arrangements 
between distribution firms and other parts of the industry, until recently distribution 
companies (DISCOs) were under the management of NTDC and PEPCO (NEPRA 2010).  
However,  DISCOs are functioning as unbundled units and are also performing as retail 
businesses in monopoly controlled areas. 
There is theoretical justification along with international practice for the natural 
monopoly status of distribution networks and the efforts to “unbundle” electric utility in 
Pakistan.  The electricity unbundling initiative started in the US in 1980s and a number of 
countries, including the UK have “unbundled” electricity supply. According to the basic 
model, the network part of industry became a natural monopoly while power generation 
firms became part of the competitive market. The intuition for cost saving by one 
distributor sounds plausible, the unit cost is likely to go down as the number of customers 
or load increases on a system in a limited geographical location. But there could be limits 
to economies of scale because grid stations, distribution lines, and interconnectors 
become overstressed as load increases in a given location. Similarly, diseconomies in 
equipment maintenance and overheads along with other x-inefficiencies can  emerge as 
distribution network area expands unboundedly.10 
 
2.1.  Distribution Networks  
The distribution networks supply electricity from the transmission system to lines 
below 220 kilo volt, the network infrastructure includes distribution lines and 132 kilo 
volt and lower capacity grid stations. As shown in Table 1 below, the electricity industry 
suffers  from high system losses (including theft) and high revenue losses. The non-theft 
system losses can be attributed to the current state of technology and to the size of the 
distribution network. The resistance loss increases as the size of a distribution network 
 
9
In Pakistan distribution companies also perform the role of electricity supplier or retailing. In 
principle, a government or a private firm can run retail business by procuring electricity and paying to 
intermediary firms in power supply chain.  The words distribution companies, DISCOs, and utilities are used 
interchangeably in this paper for electricity suppliers. 
10
As demand for new connections increases or power is supplied to household not already connected to 
the system. 
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increases and the system loss can also increase as demand increases. The regulator 
reports that “distribution system in urban centres is over stressed and needs to be 
upgraded, augmented, and expanded” [NEPRA (2010)]. Therefore technical line losses 
can arise both in large networks (due to resistance) and in small congested distribution 
networks due to resistance and high demand. 
On the other hand, system losses caused by theft and revenue losses can arise from 
managerial inefficiency and corrupt governance in the network segment. Even technical 
losses resulting from poor engineering design and system operation can be a result of bad 
governance and lack of planning. The influence of managerial effort and pure technical 
losses cannot be disentangled, as disaggregate data for the required analysis is not 
available, however conjecture can be made where decentralised system loss data is 
available for a distribution network. Similarly, the potential of theft can be assessed from 
the number of customers and total number of households not connected to national grid in 
a given distribution network.  
The average area of a government owned distribution system is 98 thousand square 
kilometres with average density of 67 customers per square kilometre, as shown in Table 1. 
There is considerable variation in peak load demand and composition of urban towns 
among networks. There is significant negative correlation (–0.65) between a network 
density and the system losses (including theft) or recovery (billing) losses.11 Technical, 
structural and managerial diseconomies exist in large distribution companies. For instance, 
Hyderabad Supply Company HESCO is losing more than one-third electricity from the 
system and on the top of it recovering money for less than 60 per cent of final electricity 
sold.12  The trends in Table 1 persist over time (see Table 2, and Table 3). 
The genuine system losses are not disentangled from theft losses, but three 
companies QESCO, HESCO, PESCO are susceptible to huge theft losses due to political 
instability and lawlessness in the region.13 The high losses also suggest that basic 
infrastructure is getting overstressed and requires maintenance and replacements, while 
investment in substations, distribution lines, and human capital will depend on the 
financial health of the firm which in turn depends on system losses and billing losses. 
 
Table 1 
Electricity Prices, Density, and Losses for Distribution Companies, 2010 
Distribution Total 
Consumers 
Peak demand Density System
1
 Billing Power Purchase Price 
(rupee/kWh) Company (MW) (consumer/area) Losses (%) Losses (%) 
IESCO 2,059,207 1457   88.9  9.8 4.1 7.6 
LESCO 3,182,292 3916 166.9 13.7 8.2 8.2 
GEPCO 2,454,254 1813 142.6 11.0 4.0 8.1 
FESCO 2,879,188 2298    65.0 10.9 3.0 8.2 
MEPCO 4,057,491 3006    38.5 18.9 4.2 8.7 
PESCO 2,947,108 3685    29.0 37.0      14.6 11.4 
HESCO 1,511,878 1797   11.2 34.8      40.2 11.0 
QESCO 490,805 1316     1.4 20.7      42.3 9.0 
KESC 2,051,964 2562 315.7 34.9 
 
 
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2010-11, 1 distribution network losses. 
 
11
Except privatised KESC distributing electricity in Karachi, high line losses in KESC are probably 
caused by theft and lawlessness in a city of 12.9 million. 
12
The regulation authority appears to be concerned about the inefficiencies in large distribution 
networks; HESCO was divided into two distribution companies in 2011 (HESCO and SEPCO). 
13
This is validated by published regulator reports and unstructured interviews with officials. 
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Table 2 
Distribution Network, Total System Losses1, (%) 
Distribution 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012   Company 
Peshawar 31.8 32.2 32.4 35.2 34.7 35.2 34.9 
Islamabad 13.3 12.2 10.3 10.8 9.8 9.7 9.5 
Lahore 10.2 11.7 11.2 10.7 11.0 12.0 11.2 
Gujranwala 13.1 12.8 12.5 13.3 13.8 13.3 13.5 
Faisalabad 11.6 11.5 11.1 10.6 10.8 11.2 10.8 
Multan 20.5 18.7 18.5 18.4 18.9 18.2 19.3 
Hyderabad 39.2 37.0 35.9 35.1 34.8 28.6 27.7 
Sukkur      49.4 49.4 
Quetta 20.7 21.4 20.8 20.1 20.7 20.4 20.8 
Karachi 37.5 34.2 33.8 38.5 37.3 34.8 32.6 
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2010, 2011, 1 percentage gap between units purchased and 
sold/billed by the firm. 
 
Table 3 
Distribution Network, Revenue Losses for Domestic Consumers1, (%) 
Distribution Company 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Peshawar 23.0 48.3  28.0 48.8 
Islamabad 2.0 –3.0 0.4 4.0 –1.1 
Lahore 1.0 3.8 3.1 0.8 -1.5 
Gujranwala 2.0 3.1 4.1 2.0 3.4 
Faisalabad 1.0 1.8 1.7 0.8 0.2 
Multan 1.0 2.2 3.6 1.7 1.2 
Hyderabad 26.0 42.1 51.1 54.1 36.7 
Sukkur2     62.8 
Quetta 10.0  28.2 31.0 26.5 
Karachi 100.0 0.0 0.0 17.1 16.2 
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2010, 2011. 1 percentage gap between amount billed and amount 
recovered, 2 Sukkur was part of Hyderabad before 2012. The negative numbers show additional 
recovery on account of deferred payments for previous years. 
 
Despite area-losses correlation, the other factors in poorly performing distribution 
regions cannot be ignored, these include lack of good governance, law and order, and 
economic development.14 High system losses of distribution companies manifest in the 
power purchase price for distribution companies, in 2010 price ranged from 7.6 rupees 
per kilowatt hour to 11.4 rupees per kilowatt hour.15 The high revenue losses in 
technically inefficient distribution companies suggest that incentives for improvements in 
management are low. New investment is not taking place due to poor financial 
 
14
Particularly poor state of law and order and weak political administrative structure in Quetta QESCO, 
Hyderabad HESCO, and Peshawar PESCO regions 
15
The variation in regional power purchase price is not in contradiction with uniform tariff policy as 
average tariffs are affected by consumer mix and other tariff adjustment by the regulator as shown in Table 9.  
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performance, which restricts the capability of firms to improve system losses, turning into 
a vicious circle. 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the time trend for system losses, revenue losses and 
potential consumers without electricity respectively. In theory, housing units without 
formal electricity connections are not connected to the system, but in practice they might 
be informally connected to the system without any billing meter16, particularly in 
congested areas and remote areas where monitoring of the system is poor or the 
employees submit to bribes. A major fraction of household consumers are not connected 
to the system in distribution networks operating in Peshawar (PESCO), Hyderabad 
(HESCO), Karachi (KESC), and Multan, coincidently the distribution system losses are 
also high in these firms (Table 2). This supports the hypothesis that households not 
connected to the system in the congested systems, such as KESC, enjoy stolen electricity  
from the system. However, it is difficult to attribute system losses to theft in low density 
networks, such as HESCO, because the system is losing at low voltage lines while 
supplying electricity to a dispersed population, for instance a high feeder is supplying 
electricity on long low voltage lines to a few scattered houses with low demand.  
On the other hand, all is not well with medium density low distribution loss 
networks as high technical inefficiency and system losses prevail in parts of these 
networks as well. Again this can be a result of poor engineering design, other technical 
losses, and managerial inefficiency. For instance Gujranwala Electricity Company 
(GEPCO) is considered to be among the better performing utilities according to regulator 
reports, however in more than 40 percent of GEPCO sub-divisions system losses are 
higher than 12 percent. 
 
Table 4 
Domestic Consumers without Electricity, (%) 
Distribution 
Company 
Potential 
Consumers 2012 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Peshawar 2,761,232 45.2 42.7 41.5 41.2 37.4 36.6 36.0 
Islamabad 1,882,619   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Lahore 2,258,940 14.1 11.5 8.6 7.3 4.9 2.6 0.6 
Gujranwala 2,808,748 20.6 17.1 14.6 12.5 10.0 7.7 5.7 
Faisalabad 2,712,234 30.4 25.7 21.2 18.1 15.8 13.4 11.3 
Multan 3,888,629 45.4 40.2 35.8 33.8 31.2 29.5 27.3 
Hyderabad 718,422 71.2 70.5 70.3 70.2 70.1 70.1 67.5 
Sukkur 552,110       72.8 
Quetta 394,843 71.9 71.2 70.6 70.0 69.7 69.6 69.4 
Karachi 1,659,766 22.2 21.3 21.6 22.5 21.5 20.6 20.8 
Source:  NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2010, 2011, estimates suffer substantial downward bias due to lower 
estimated total potential consumer data in the distribution network, particularly in later years, the last 
Population Census was conducted in 1998 and the available projections are much lower than actual 
figures based on partial housing census of 2012. 
 
16An illegal connection to system without a meter is called “kunda” (the hook on the wire) in local 
jargon 
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Overall issues with system losses, engineering design, and managerial practices will 
affect cost of electricity supply. The system losses result in higher average unit cost of 
electricity with negative welfare consequences for consumers. The shortage of bulk supply 
coupled with system losses result in long periods of load shedding and low system reliability. 
The system reliability in industry is measured by utilities reporting System Average 
Interruption Index (SAIFI) and System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI). The 
long durations of power outage due to lack of power supply in the system render SAIFI and 
SAIDI meaningless as it becomes hard to disentangle the interruptions when there was no 
power supply and the interruptions when power supply was there, but utility network 
collapsed due to poor technology.  SAIFI and SAIDI are reported in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5 
Distribution System Performances, 2008-09 
Distribution 
Consumers SAIFI1 SAIDI2   Company 
Islamabad 2,059,207 0.5 22.8 
Lahore 3,182,292 100.2 6847.7 
Gujranwala 2,454,254 17.3 19.4 
Faisalabad 2,879,188 64.9 114731.9 
Multan 4,057,491 0.03 2.01 
Peshawar 2,947,108 193.97 15787.43 
Hyderabad 1,511,878 918.53 83969.3 
Quetta 490,805 155.4 12757.3 
Karachi 2,051,964 0.1 1074.6 
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2010. 
1 SAIFI= (Frequency of Interruption/Total Connected Customers).  
2 SAIDI= (Hours of Interruption/Total Connected Customers). 
 
2.2.  Transmission Network 
The transmission network plays a fundamental role in coordination and achieving 
system economies, and enables the reliable, stable, and efficient supply of electricity for 
final use in homes, markets and industries. The importance of the transmission network 
in electricity industry depends on its critical function and not just operational cost, as the 
smaller cost17 component of the transmission network in total cost of electricity can be 
misleading [Joskow and Schmalensee (1988)]. Generation and transmission operations of 
electricity are simultaneous decisions, transmission lines link power plants to load 
centres, and installing new generation capacity depends on interconnectors and lines 
facilities provided by transmission companies. The long run, low cost supply of 
electricity depends on investment and new technology adoption in transmission, and  on a 
high level of coordination between generation and load centres. Lack of coordination and 
investment in transmission systems can make generation investments ineffective or can 
 
17
The cost components of generation, distribution, and transmission in Pakistan are 90 percent, 8 
percent, and 2 percent respectively. However when system losses are included effective cost of network 
components increase substantially. 
514 Amir Jahan Khan 
delay the supply of electricity due to dysfunctional interconnectors,18 this institutional 
context of electricity industry has favoured vertical integration of generation-transmission 
and distribution. The existence of economies of scale in the use of high voltage lines and 
transmission links make transmission networks work efficiently as a natural monopoly. 
While the natural monopoly structure of transmission exists in the electricity industry, 
however for efficiency reasons high level coordination between transmission and other 
components of industry is required for an efficient and stable system.  
Sunk costs in investments, formal and informal contracts, and system externalities 
are main features of any transmission network. The investment decisions by transmission 
operators require high level coordination between load centres and generators, as post 
investment reallocation of transmission infrastructure and resources becomes costly. It is 
not clear that decentralisation (unbundling) in industry structure will increase or reduce 
the electricity supply cost in the system. This aspect is important in Pakistan where policy 
making authority appears to pursue more decentralisation and structural disintegration in 
the system with independent distribution and transmission networks. The successful 
unbundling of electric power will require mechanisms for the enforcement of formal 
contracts and regulatory set up to resolve contingencies uncovered in formal contracts. 
National Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC) works as a licensed 
monopoly, sole service provider covering a large area. Although there is no optimal scale 
for system coordination, some past studies (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1988) mention 
10,000 MW of peak demand for efficient scale of transmission network. The area 
coverage and peak load demand suggest problems in NTDC system, constraints in extra 
high voltage transmission lines resulted in increased forced outage of the power system 
[NEPRA (2010)].  The overall transmission losses in recent years are comparable with 
international standards [World Bank (2011)], see Table 6.  
The inexorable electricity demand in Pakistan, particularly the air-conditioning 
during summer months, has pushed the peak demand to 16,000 MW in the system19 
[NEPRA (2011)]. In an electricity system, supply needs to meet demand in real time, the 
system becomes unstable if demand is higher than supply.20 On the other hand, the 
system should be able to hold supply to match rising demand.  System operators need to 
check the reliability of transmission systems to sustain peak demand, as policy makers 
are keen to increase supply to meet unfulfilled demand in the future. It appears that over 
the years, large gaps between demand and supply of electricity during long summer 
season has weakened the coordination system between transmission and distribution 
networks. The load centres (i.e. DISCOs) are unable to determine potential demand in the 
summer season, as full demand is not met in all parts of the network at any given time. 
There are even reported incidents stating that when some DISCOs tried to meet peak 
demand, the distribution network was unable to sustain the load. 
 
18
For instance, recently a number of new power plants failed to supply electricity because of inadequate 
capacity of interconnectors and transmission system (NEPRA 2011). 
19
The minister for power affairs recently mentioned in an interview that during hot summer months 
demand keeps on exceeding supply  despite system adding electricity from more production or new plants. In 
summer, rolling blackouts have been observed since 2008 that imply system operator might not even know 
exact peak demand during summer.   
20
Constraints in transmission or distribution networks can make power system unstable; the load 
shedding is required to keep the system stable. Since 2008 load shedding is prevalent in country particularly in 
summer months. 
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Table 6 
Energy Generation, Units Sold, and Losses in NTDC System, 2002-2010 
 
Net Units Sold Transmission Distribution 
Year Generation(GWh) Billed (GWh) Losses (%) Losses (%) 
2002 59545 45204 7.6 16 
2003 62694 47421 7.7 16.2 
2004 67697 51492 7.3 16.1 
2005 71670 55342 7.4 14.9 
2006 80404 62405 7.1 14.8 
2007 85987 67480 3.7 17.3 
2008 84584 66539 3.4 17.5 
2009 82705 65286 3.5 17.1 
2010 87072 68878 3.1 17.4 
Source: GOP, Electricity Demand Forecast, NTDC. 
 
3.  TARIFF STRUCTURE AND INCENTIVE REGULATION 
 
3.1.  Cost of Service and Incentive Regulation: Theoretical Aspects 
According to the regulator, the electricity industry in Pakistan is subject to price, 
entry and quality of service regulation [NEPRA (2010)], the regulator, NEPRA, 
determines tariffs for transmission, distribution, and generation business of electricity. 
This section examines the theory of incentive regulation in the context of unbundled 
distribution and transmission electricity networks. The basic idea is to review the issues 
that arise when the regulator is imperfectly informed and faces asymmetric information 
about costs and managerial efficiency, and is unable to document the optimal price 
mechanism in specific scenarios. The prevalent tariff structure in Pakistan is reviewed 
later to check the conformity with theoretical knowledge and also to see if the electricity 
industry satisfies basic assumptions for exposure to incentive regulation for unbundled 
electricity networks [Joskow (2008)].  
The knowledge about effectiveness of electricity network regulation in Pakistan is 
limited, Malik (2007) documented the overview of electricity regulation in Pakistan, and 
highlighted issues including, the ineffectiveness of the regulator, the lack of autonomy 
and weak governance of NEPRA, although it is not quite clear what incentives there are 
for network operators in the current setup to cut cost and enhance efficiency. There are 
multiple factors affecting the current state of the electricity industry in Pakistan, but 
regulation framework and related incentives appear to be an important constraint in the 
growth of the electricity industry.21 
The proper incentives for firms, operating regulated networks, are important for 
the efficiency of networks and the generation segment, because well performing networks 
will lead to better decisions and operations by generation firms. The network service cost 
contributes to final electricity supply cost, better incentives manifested in lower networks 
 
21
The comparison of electricity industry between a state monopoly (till 2002), and regulated industry 
since 2002 requires deeper understanding of issues in both periods, and is not feasible due to limited 
information available.  
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cost can improve welfare for society. While documenting the regulatory discussion Kahn 
(1971) noted that “......the central institutional questions have to do with the nature and 
adequacy of the incentives and pressures that influence private management in making 
the critical economic decisions”. Ideally networks should be operated at minimum cost 
and the regulator should specify the efficient network price. However, the economic 
incentives in lowering production costs are more important than enforcing the efficient 
pricing mechanism. This point is well documented in the literature, as the efficiency loss 
of high cost is of “first order” (impact all infra marginal units) while tariff or price 
inefficiency loss is second order (Harberger triangle). These earlier notions and the latter 
theoretical advances provide the foundation for incentive regulation in electricity and 
other networks.    
In a typical situation ex-ante, a regulator is not perfectly informed about 
managerial efforts, technical processes and other factors to lower networks cost, but can 
get more information through ex post regulatory hearings and mandatory audits. 
However, the distribution and transmission companies are better informed about the cost 
of production and managerial practices adopted to improve efficiency. In this situation 
two extreme tariff regimes can be followed according to Laffont and Tirole (1993).  
The first regime is a fixed price regime, where network fees will be charged to 
consumers by distribution companies going forward. The fixed network charge will 
evolve by incorporating exogenous price changes in factor inputs; this is referred to as a 
price cap mechanism [Joskow (2008)]. As a price mechanism is responsive to only 
exogenous price changes, the firm’s increased effort to lower cost will result in an equal 
amount added to the profit of the firm. Therefore the effective price cap mechanism 
provides greater incentives for the network operator to increase managerial efforts to 
reduce cost, improve system efficiency, and lower system losses. But given that the 
regulator wants to make sure that the firm meets budget constraints, uncertainty arises 
about the level of price cap. Too high a price cap can still generate incentives to lower 
cost but may leave large profits for firms, so the mechanism will not be good from “rent 
extraction” point of view. 
Second regime is standard “cost of service regulation”, under this mechanism the 
network operator will be compensated for all of the production or service costs incurred 
to run a network. This tariff plan makes sure that firms earn normal profit, so the “rent 
extraction” issue discussed above can be fixed, but on the other hand there are no 
incentives for firms to reduce costs as there is no economic rent left by the regulator. 
Therefore managers will not get a reward for any cost savings in the “cost of service” 
regulatory plan, or they will overspend in capital expenses in line with Averch-Johnson 
effects. The fixed price (price cap) regime performs poorly on “rent extraction” while 
“cost of service” regimes will provide no space for being cost efficient. In an ideal 
situation a mixture of two regimes can perform better than the adoption of a single 
regime when the regulator is imperfectly informed about networks [Joskow (2008)], so in 
effect the price will be contingent on variation in realised cost, while a portion of cost 
will be fixed ex ante [Schmalensee (1989), Lyon (1996)]. 
As noted by Joskow (2008) the theoretical literature provides partial guidance for 
incentive regulation in electricity networks, and other circumstance based factors are also 
incorporated in the practical regulation mechanism adopted by regulatory authorities. In 
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practice, a mix of “price cap” and “cost of service” mechanism is adopted by utilities. An 
initial price level Po is set by using cost based or “return to capital employed” yardstick 
and adjusted  for the rate of input price increase (RPI) and productivity factor z of firms 
in latter time periods, which gives equation,  
1 0 (1 RPI )ZP P     … … … … … … (1) 
The tariffs are initially imposed for usually five years and at the end of the period 
Po and Z are readjusted after post regulation audit and  for the firm’s realised costs. In 
practice, incentive regulation requires an established cost of the service based regulation 
system. In Pakistan the cost of service or rate base regulation started effectively in 2004, 
and from then on the regulator conducts “pricing reviews” to determine tariffs, this 
mechanism is evolving and recent regulatory reports mention methodological process of 
tariff determination.22 In the next subsection the tariff or distribution margin 
determination process for distribution networks is analysed, this will serve two purposes. 
First, the regulator’s information sources for distribution companies costs are highlighted, 
and the effectiveness of cost reporting protocols are assessed. Second,  we check the 
potential of the regulator’s current cost information for credible benchmarking of 
incentive regulation. 
 
3.2.  Cost of Service and Incentive Regulation: Practical Issues 
The analysis of incentive regulation for electricity networks usually assumes that 
the electricity supply is unbundled with a clearly defined distribution and transmission 
network, and the industry is regulated by an independent regulator staffed with adequate 
strength and skills to monitor the industry and implement regulation activities (Joskow, 
2008), both of these assumptions are subject to caveats in Pakistan. Although the 
electricity delivery is unbundled, contractual relationships between network utilities, i.e. 
DISCOs and transmission monopoly, i.e. NTDC are not well established, at least on 
transparency grounds [NEPRA (2010)]. The appointment of the board of directors for 
DISCOs and interference of NTDC in DISCOs highlights the lack of independence  of 
utilities to run their managerial affairs. The regulator faces constraints to implement the 
procedures and monitor generation and transmission activities, and standard procedures 
to supply basic industry data have not yet been adopted by distribution networks, from 
regulator reports it appears that although uniform system of accounts for DISCOs were 
proposed, such systems have not been operational till recently.  
The cost of electricity supply includes generation cost, transmission cost, and 
distribution margins (DM), these tariff components are fixed by the regulator NEPRA. In 
2011 the distribution margin including line losses contributed to approximately 25 
percent of the average electricity cost, while network fees were less than 2 percent of 
average electricity cost.23 The tariff structure is based on cost of service or rate of return 
regulation, the electricity networks recover costs through distribution margin and 
transmission cost. The cost is collected from consumers by DISCOs, and then DISCOs 
transfer power purchase price24 including transmission fees to the central 
 
22
NEPRA tariff determination 2012-13. 
23
Estimates based on public data (NEPRA 2011). 
24
Power Purchase Price PPP is a pass through cost item. 
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transmission/dispatch company NTDC.25 In a single buyer model, NTDC procures 
electricity from all generators at the prices agreed in Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) 
and transmits bulk power to DISCOs on high voltage lines. The regulator enforces the 
tariff mechanism under the principle that network operators (transmission and 
distribution firms) recover sufficient return on capital to cover all operation costs and 
reasonable funds for capacity expansion for future needs (NEPRA 2010). The tariff is 
imposed for a period, and intermediate requests for fuel adjustment charges are 
entertained by the regulator. The frequency of pricing reviews and average cost for a 
selected distribution company are shown in Appendix Table 1A and Figure 2.  
The regulatory tariff standards listed in the Appendix (see Table 2A) and the 
discussion above imply that the current practice of price regulation in the electricity 
industry is set in a “cost of service” or rate of return framework. There is no “price cap” 
mechanism enforced and tariff petitions are settled on a case-to-case basis. The 
distribution networks are publicly owned monopolies facing no incentives to cut 
operation costs or line losses as ultimately government through subsidy have to finance 
the cost of the distribution companies to meet their budget constraints. Earlier, some of 
the distribution companies proposed multi-year tariffs for five year periods, but the 
regulator declared an incentive based price cap regime unsuitable for the government 
owned distribution companies, until the companies are partly divested or privatised 
[NEPRA (2004)]. All of the distribution networks in the main system are government 
owned; therefore the chances of incentive based regulation are minimal until distribution 
firms are privatised.  
 
Fig. 2.  Real Distribution Cost, GEPCO (Rupees per kWh) 
 
Source: NEPRA, Tariff Determination Reports Various Issues, 200-01 constant prices. 
 
25
NTDC is given transmission license for a term of thirty years in 2002 by the regulator. “The 
Company is entrusted to act as System Operator (SO), Transmission Network Operator (TNO), Central Power 
Purchase Authority (CPPA) and Contract Registrar and Power Exchange Administrator (CRPEA)” [NEPRA 
(2011)]. 
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3.3 Case Study of a Distribution Network 
The analysis based on a sample distribution company, Gujranwala Electric Power 
Company (GEPCO) shows that the regulator determines a firm’s distribution margin on 
the basis of reported costs for operation and maintenance, depreciation, and Return On 
Rate Base (RORB) (e.g. cost of capital). The frequency of pricing reviews for GEPCO is 
given in Table 1A. The distribution margin26 is the economic rent, which the firm gets for 
operating the distribution network. The margin consists of operation and maintenance 
expenses, depreciation charges, and return on rate base, further adjustments are made for 
any income earned by the firm. The detail of the distribution margin components is given 
in Table 7.  
Operation and maintenance expenses, including wage and salaries, are the largest 
component of a distribution network’s cost (about 90 percent) excluding transfer prices 
for generation and transmission companies. Distribution networks are public owned 
companies and jobs are sanctioned for various pay scales historically with employees 
entitled to post retirement benefits. The regulator allows costs for salaries and wages 
based on past audited figures with the adjustment of annual pay increases of public 
employees and the impact of hiring on vacant positions, with very little allowance for 
new staff hiring, particularly for non-technical contract employees.27 But pricing reviews 
reveal information asymmetry with the regulator, for instance, in 2012 the regulator 
allowed Rs 3,563 million for wages and salary, while audited account puts the figure at 
Rs 5,040 million. Apparently, the company spends money through public exchequer and 
put in prior year adjustments in the next year “pricing review”. This shows a lack of 
consistent accounts data availability for current expenses of workers’ wages and post-
retirement benefits. The regulator matches the GEPCO request for new staff hiring with 
the justification for “prudent utility practices”, while neither of the firms supply matching 
information on any potential “efficient utility practices” gained by new hiring, nor does 
the regulator specify any yardstick for new appointments.  
 
Table 7 
Distribution Margin GEPCO, Selected Years (Million Rupees) 
 2006-7 2007-8 2008-9 2011-12 2012-13 
Operation and Maintenance 3,298 3,254 3,739 6,318 5,454 
Depreciation 510 556 829 971 1,098 
Other Income –970 –970 –1,116 –1,505 –1,960 
Return on Assets 893 799 1,522 1,313 1,583 
Income Tax  195    
Net Distribution Margin 3,732 3,833 4,979 7,097 6,175 
Source: NEPRA, Tariff Determination Reports Various Issues, data is missing for some years. 
 
26
Although revenue requirements of a distribution network include power purchase price including 
transmission network user fee but that requirement is part of transfer fees so is not directly related to incentive 
items for a distribution company.  
27
GEPCO is a 100  percent Public Sector Company, since unbundling the employees are hired on 
contractual basis and regularised to permanent posts after sometime. 
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This is quite similar to the situation when new investment requirements by the firm 
are matched with potential system improvement gains to justify new investment. The lack 
of information coordination between the regulator and the distribution company 
underlines the gap in current cost-based regulation regime. This information gap needs to 
be filled in order to set the platform for incentive based regulation and continual human 
capital investment in the distribution firm.28  
 
Table 8 
Rate Base GEPCO, Selected Years (Million Rupees) 
 2011-12* 2012-13** 
Opening Fixed Assets in Operation 27,681 31,379 
Assets Transferred During the Year 3,698 2,914 
Gross Fixed Assets in Operation 31,379 34,239 
Less: Accumulated Depreciation 9,387 10,485 
Net Average Fixed Assets in Operation(Rate Base) 21,992 23,754 
Plus: Capital Work In Progress (closing) 2,811 4,371 
Total Fixed Assets 24,803 28,125 
Less: Deferred Credit 11,516 13,324 
Total Regulatory Base 13,287 14,801 
Source: NEPRA, Tariff Determination Reports Various Issues, data is missing for some years,* actual, ** projected. 
 
Since regulation started in 2004, it is important that in this early stage, standards in 
cost-based reporting are set and benchmarks are established in order to  enforce cost-
based regulation effectively. To some extent goals were set at the same time as the “rate 
base” was set in 2004, and updated accordingly in pricing reviews (Table 8). However, 
the basic accounting information is coming from the distribution company through 
internal audit reports. The regulator requests for the required information from firms, but  
has not commissioned any study to determine the standards for various cost components, 
listed in Table 7 and Table 8.  
According to regulation rules, sufficient tariffs should be allowed to generate a 
reasonable investment in technology to maintain the system and improve the reliability of 
the electricity supply [NEPRA (2012-13)]. In practice the regulator  examines the effect 
of a firm’s capital investment on rate base, so that chances of overinvestment can be 
reduced. However there is no mechanism available to ascertain a reasonable amount of 
investment in infrastructure that will ensure a reliable electricity supply. In regulatory 
pricing reviews, GEPCO has not provided evidence of any perceived benefits of 
proposed investment to the regulator, but the regulator allowed investment on the basis of 
past trends. That shows a gap of information in the regulatory system which can result in 
overinvestment or under investment in infrastructure for distribution companies. Since a 
reliable electricity supply depends on continued investment in infrastructure, the 
regulator should develop a detailed knowledge base for the investment needs of 
distribution firms after taking into account future demand growth and system reliability.  
 
28
The current annual total investment in the government owned network segments is US $ 885 million 
while the Ministry of Water and Power (MWP) reports that US $ 6 billion is required to revamp the national 
grid. 
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4.  PUBLIC SECTOR OWNERSHIP, SUBSIDY, AND  
REFORMS INCENTIVE 
The   electricity supply network including distribution companies DISCOs and the 
transmission company NTDC are publicly owned monopolies,29 this is in line with 
industry practice in most countries where the natural monopoly part of a power supply 
chain is treated as a regulated monopoly.30  The power sector reforms started in the 1990s 
to unbundle electricity industry and thereby establish distribution networks as 
independent organisations with their own command and management structure. However 
corporatisation of DISCOs has not been worked out fully and no formal contractual 
relationship exists among transmission, distribution and generation (government owned) 
segments of the industry [NEPRA (2010)]. A new government-owned establishment, 
Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO), was formed in 1998, to corporatise 
generation, distribution and transmission units of the vertically integrated state monopoly 
WAPDA, and make these entities administratively and financially independent.  
Published reports by the regulator suggest that PEPCO continues to interfere in 
matters of government-owned generation and distribution firms, posing problems for 
independent and optimal decision making and resource allocation of these firms. The 
distribution networks claim that noncompliance  with efficiency and quality regulation 
targets results because of centralised management of routine decision making through 
PEPCO [NEPRA (2011)]. This gives an impression that the power industry has not 
completed the transition from state monopoly to unbundled electric supply. On the one 
hand, the efficiency gains from vertical integration and central planning have decreased, 
while on the other hand, scant benefits have emerged from unbundling. The actual 
situation regarding overall management practices in industry might be even worse, as in 
the past all of the firms were part of a vertically integrated monopoly with coherent 
managerial hierarchy, while in the post-reforms period there is an increase in an 
interventionist role of other ministries and corporatisation  departments.31  
In the following discussion, two questions are raised. First, what is the role of 
public institutions in allocating resources among distribution firms and how efficient are 
these transfer mechanisms? Second, what is the motivation for changing ownership from 
public to private enterprise in the electricity industry and is there any evidence within the 
industry to support this? 
The government of Pakistan has adopted a uniform electricity price policy across 
the distribution networks in the country, although prices vary across different customer 
categories within each distribution network. The regulator determines the retail price of 
electricity for a distribution network after taking into account revenue requirements of the 
firm including distribution margin, while the government only allows a uniform end user 
price according to the lowest determined price for each customer category among all 
distribution firms [Pakistan (2013)]. The government does not allow the full passing on 
of the electricity supply cost to customers, the gap between the cost of electricity and 
 
29
There are also some generation plants owned by public generation companies GENCOs. 
30
Although electricity networks can potentially save resources as regulated natural monopolies, but they 
are not necessarily government owned in practice.  
31
A complete study of history of reforms requires detailed information and  is beyond the scope of the 
present study.  
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government set tariff results in a subsidy referred to as tariff differential subsidy (TDS), 
Table 8 highlights this gap for few periods. The failure of the government to settle tariff 
differential subsidy, regularly results in the accumulation of Circular Debt32 in the 
electricity industry. The other major contribution  to this resource gap emerges from the 
inability of distribution firms to collect revenue (either in the shape of no recovery of 
bills or high system losses, see Table 1). 
        
Table 9 
Average Cost of Electricity Supply and Price charged in Rupees 
Period Cost Per1 KWh Price Per2 KWh Gap Per KWh 
24 February 2007 5.14 4.25 0.89 
01 March 2008 5.6 4.78 0.82 
05 September 2008 8.42 5.58 2.84 
25 February 2009 8.42 5.63 2.79 
01 October 2009 8.42 5.96 2.46 
01 January 2010 10.09 6.67 3.39 
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2011, 1 Cost based Tariff determined by regulator 2 Consumer-end 
Tariff  determined by Pakistani Government. 
 
The tariff differential subsidy is transferred by the central government to the central 
power purchasing company NTDC, and the NTDC allocates the subsidy among distribution 
firms. During 2007 to 2012 Rs1.29 trillion worth of price subsidies for distribution networks 
was transferred to the central transmission company. There is no transparent information 
available for the transfer of these payments [Pakistan (2013)]. Assuming transfers are made 
according to the actual difference between regulator price (cost of electricity supply) and the 
consumer end price (government allowed), the resulting subsidy allocation mechanism lacks 
any incentive for an efficient distribution firm. On the contrary, subsidy payment compensates 
for inefficiency caused by a distribution firm. 
For instance, Peshawar Electric Supply Corporation (PESCO) experiences the 
highest operation cost including line losses, but it charges the end consumer the price of 
the lowest cost supply firm according to the government policy. As a result, PESCO 
recovers substantial business cost through tariff differential subsidy, while an efficient 
supply firm collects most resources through consumers. Since fulfilling budget balance 
constraints and subsidy internalisation mechanisms are not transparent, therefore, the 
exact welfare consequences for each firm are not clear. However, in the current 
regulation and subsidy transfer system there are virtually no incentives for unbundled 
electricity networks to increase efficiency and reduce system losses.  
 
4.1.  Privatisation Reforms 
The basic idea of the 1990s strategic reforms for state monopoly was to make 
unbundled firms in the electricity industry administratively and financially viable and 
 
32
Circular Debt is common terminology in Electricity Industry of Pakistan, the debt is caused by 
accumulation of deficit which results when payments flow in supply chain of power is  disrupted. The 
distribution companies do not pay to the transmission company (power purchasing agency) that does not pay to 
power generators who do not pay to oil/gas supply companies for fuel. 
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then sell these firms to the private sector. However, current financial chaos partially 
caused by the political pricing regulation regime (uniform end user electricity price), lack 
of financial transparency in unbundled firms, and the Circular Debt, probably provide 
few incentives to private buyers to invest in the electricity network business.33 For 
instance, for some time now,  publicly owned distribution firms with high line and 
revenue losses have been potentially available for privatisation,34, but so far, have not 
been privatised despite government efforts. 
In theory, if electricity is considered as a basic infrastructure facility and the 
government wants to continue the supply of electricity to consumers at an “affordable” 
price, then the government can transmit and distribute electricity in-house or procure 
through a private supplier.  The private owner has an incentive to lower costs while 
facing a given output price, but the private supplier might lower product quality. The 
private supplier might lower quality of the product, as quality is non-contractible 
component of the contract [Hart, et al. (1997)]. In the case of the electricity supply 
specifying the quality of product is relatively easier than another public good such as 
schooling or hospital as electricity is a homogenous product. The private distribution 
firms can be monitored by a quality regulation regime with specific parameters including 
average interruption indices. The efficiency gains and asset ownership incentives also go 
in favour of the private supplier, as private firms can offer a more flexible contract to 
employees depending on their human capital and experience.   
However, it is not clear what the economic gains of privatising a state monopoly 
(say a distribution network) will be, if the current regulation with asymmetric information 
along with government’s subsidy policy continues. Keeping the regulatory regime 
unchanged will result in an inefficient private monopoly instead of an inefficient public 
monopoly. The opinion on privatising state owned firms is divided among policy makers 
and politicians [World Bank (1997)], overstaffing, non-performance based worker 
salaries, and lack of transparent procurement are associated with public owned electricity 
networks [Pakistan (2013)]. However, in the absence of a fully informed regulator and 
without an incentive based regulation regime there is a chance that private firms will not 
function very differently from public firms. 
The pace of privatisation and market based reforms in the electricity industry are 
slow, so far one distribution firm, Karachi Electricity Supply Corporation (KESC), has 
been sold to private firms. KESC was privatised in 2005; the comparison between KESC 
and other distribution companies can give some idea about potential gains by 
privatisations in some selected indicators. As the government implements the same tariff 
policy in the whole country, so KESC also receives a public subsidy to cover the 
difference between cost of electricity supply and average tariff charged to costumers. 
However KESC’s policy is to cut power for longer hours in the locations where revenue 
recovery is low and theft or system loss is higher. Although KESC earned profit for the 
first time in 2012, the system losses are still high, Table 2. There is a modest reduction in 
KESC losses, again it is not clear if that shows improvement in infrastructure or the 
 
33
PEPCO was formed in 1998 to monitor unbundling and corporatisation for two years, the slow pace 
of reforms can be judged from the fact that PEPCO dissolution occurred in 2012.   
34
Some of electricity firms including PESCO, QESCO, HESCO, and FESCO are listed on privatisation 
priority list, not clear about the timing of the inclusion or any future selling date.  Privatisation Commission 
Pakistan  http://www.privatisation.gov.pk/power/power.htm (Accessed 13 September 2012). 
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effectiveness of a better load shedding management plan.  In comparison, no incentives 
are available to government owned distribution companies (DISCOs) to lower cost and 
improve quality of the electricity supply. The government recently reconstituted boards 
of directors for DISCOs and increased the number of private board members in these 
public companies, but still the utilities are far from privatisation.  
 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The cost of supplying electricity and the price charged to consumers are two basic 
parameters that can be employed to evaluate the performance of power sector reforms 
and the future of the industry. The production incentives generated by current ownership 
structure and the regulatory regime, along with other residual factors, are affecting price 
and cost of the electricity supply. The price charged for electricity produced is not 
covering the cost of production giving incentives for consumers to overuse electricity. 
The inefficiencies in distribution networks including high line losses and low recovery 
are   making the electricity supply costly.  
The technical losses in the system cannot be disentangled from non-technical 
losses (including theft), continuous investment in physical capital and system 
maintenance is required to improve the reliability of the electricity supply and reduce 
technical losses. The experience of privatisation of one utility does not support that non-
technical losses can be reduced in short run with a change of management or ownership 
structure. The multiproduct nature of the electricity supply requires a reliable demand 
forecast, as the cost of the electricity supply in high-demand summer hours will be 
different from the low-demand winter season. The cost of the high-demand season 
supplies has to incorporate future investment in infrastructure in order to ensure 
reliability. In the current practice, the regulator and the firms lack sufficient knowledge 
about the required investment and potential costs of a multiproduct electricity supply. 
In the current practice, investment rules of utilities that would affect system loss 
reduction efforts and timely investment for reliable supply of electricity are not being 
implemented. The distribution firms lack information  about the investment gap or at 
least they cannot justify the required investment to the regulator, while the regulator has 
not set any tangible yardstick for better utility practices. This information asymmetry 
between the regulator and utilities is slowing down the growth of the electricity industry 
and is not reflecting the actual cost of a reliable electricity supply, which might be 
substantially higher than that determined by the regulator. The revenue losses and system 
losses create a real challenge to generate the investments required for revamping the 
basic network infrastructure, let alone moving to new technologies such as real-time 
monitoring and smart meters. 
Further research should focus on the economic model of electricity supply in 
Pakistan to address the fundamental question, is electricity a public good, a private good 
or a marketable public good? The historical experience in Pakistani context puts 
electricity closer to being a marketable good supplied by the government. In the current 
situation, privatisation will make electricity a privately provided public good as has 
happened in the case of Karachi Electricity Corporation (KESC),  because KESC  has 
supplied heavily subsidised electricity in private ownership since 2005. The politically 
motivated village electrification plan  falls in line with the “cheap affordable electricity” 
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model where the supply of electricity to a scattered housing unit could result in 
substantial system loss. The future industry reforms should be undertaken in light of 
further research and clarity on the business model for the electricity supply in Pakistan. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table 1A 
Tariff Determination, Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO) 
27-03-2013 Determination of the Authority in the matter of Petition filed by Gujranwala 
Electric Power Company Ltd. for Determination of its Consumer end Tariff 
Pertaining to the FY 2012-13. 
24-02-2012 Decision of the Authority in the Matter of Reconsideration Request filed by 
Ministry of Water & Power against Authority's Determination for GEPCO for 
the FY 2011-12. 
13-12-2011 Determination of the Authority in the matter of Petition filed by GEPCO for 
determination of its Consumer end Tariff Pertaining to the FY 2011-12. 
27-04-2011 Determination of the Authority in the matter of Petition filed by GEPCO for 
Determination of its Consumer end Tariff pertaining to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th 
Quarters (October - June 2011) of the FY 2010-11. 
09-12-2010 Decision of the Authority with respect to Motion for Leave for Review filed 
under Rule 16(6) of NEPRA (Tariff Standards and Procedure) Rules, 1998 by 
GEPCO against the Authority's Determination. 
08-09-2010 Determination of the Authority in the Matter of Petition filed by GEPCO for 
Determination of Consumer-End Tariff for 4th Quarter (April - June 2010) 
of FY 2009-10. 
19-04-2010 Determination of the Authority in matter of Petition filed by GEPCO for 
Determination of Consumer-end Tariff for 2nd  Quarter (October-December) 
of Fy 2009-10. 
09-12- 2009 1st Quarterly Determination Based on the FY 2009-10  Determined under 
NEPRA (Tariff Standards and Procedure) Rules, 1998 for GEPCO. 
14-09-2009 Determination of the Authority in the Matter of Petition by GEPCO for 
Determination of Consumer-end Tariff for the Year 2008-2009 under NEPRA 
(Tariff Standards and Procedure) Rules, 1998. 
15-01-2009 Modified Decision of the Authority on Federal Government's Request for the 
Reconsideration of Gujranwala Electric Power Company Ltd (GEPCO) Decision 
dated 1st January, 2009 [Case No. NEPRA/TRF-102/GEPCO-2008 (3)]. 
09-09-2008  Determination of Tariff in respect of Petition filed by (GEPCO) [(Case No. 
NEPRA/TRF-102/GEPCO-2008 (3)]. 
30-05-2008 Decision of the Authority on Federal Government's Request for the 
Reconsideration of GEPCO decision dated January 10, 2008    (Case No. 
NEPRA/TRF-36/GEPCO-2005). 
01-02-2008 Biannual Adjustment in the Consumer-end Tariff on Account of Charge in 
Power Purchase Price. 
10-01-2008 NEPRA/TRF-36/GEPCO-2005 (Revised). 
28-06-2004   NEPRA/TRF-23/GEPCO-2003. 
Notes: In between more than 35 “fuel price reviews” were conducted by NEPRA to adjust fuel prices in 
electricity supply prices.  
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Table 2A 
Regulation Standards for Tariff 
1. Tariffs should allow licensees the recovery of any and all costs prudently incurred 
to meet the demonstrated needs of their customers, provided that assessments of 
licensees' prudence may not be required where tariffs are set on other than cost-of-
service basis, such as formula-based tariffs that are designed to be in place for more 
than one year 
2. Tariffs should generally be calculated by including a depreciation charge and a rate 
of return on the capital investment of each licensee commensurate to the rate earned 
by other investments of comparable risk. 
3. Tariffs should allow licensees a rate of return which promotes continued reasonable 
investment in equipment and facilities for improved and efficient service 
4. Tariffs should include a mechanism to allow licensees a benefit from, and penalties 
for failure to achieve the efficiencies in the cost of providing the service and the 
quality of service. 
5. Tariffs should reflect marginal cost principles to the extent feasible, in view of the 
financial stability of the sector. 
6. The Authority shall have a preference for competition rather than regulation and 
shall adopt policies and establish tariffs towards that end. 
7. The tariff regime should clearly identify interclass and inter-region subsides and 
shall provide such subsides transparently if found essential, with a view to 
minimising if not eliminating them  in view of the need for an adequate transition 
period. 
8. Tariffs may be set below the level of cost of providing the service to consumers 
consuming electric power below the consumption levels determined for the purpose 
from time to time by the Authority, as long as such tariffs are financially 
sustainable. 
9. Tariffs should, to the extent feasible, reflect the full cost of service to consumer 
groups with similar service requirements. 
10. Tariff should take into account Government subsidies or the need for adjustment to 
finance rural electrification in accordance with the policies of the Government. 
11. The application of the tariffs should allow reasonable transition periods for the 
adjustments of tariffs to meet the standards and other requirements pursuant to the 
Act including the performance standards, industry standards and the uniform codes 
of conduct. 
12. Tariffs should seek to provide stability and predict ability  of customers; and 
13. Tariffs should be comprehensible, free of misinterpretation and shall state explicitly 
each component thereof. 
Source: NEPRA (2010).  
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Table 3A 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
CPPA Central Power Purchase Company 
DM Distribution Margins 
DISCOs Distribution Companies 
FESCO Faisalabad Electric Supply Company 
GEPCO Gujranwala Electric Power Company 
GENCOs Generation Companies 
GOP Government of Pakistan 
GWh Giga-watt Hours 
HESCO Hyderabad Electric Supply Company 
IESCO Islamabad Electric Supply Company 
IPP Independent Power Producers 
KESC Karachi Electricity Supply Company 
KWh Kilo-watt hours 
MEPCO Multan Electric Supply Company 
MMCF Million Cubic Feet 
MWP Ministry of Water and Power 
MW Mega Watt 
NEPRA National Electric Power Regulatory Authority 
NTDC National Transmission and Dispatch Company  
PEPCO Pakistan  Electric Power Company 
PESCO Peshawar Electric Supply Company 
PPA Power Purchase Agreement 
QESCO Quetta Electric Supply Company 
SAIFI System Average Interruption Index 
SAIDI System Average Interruption Duration Index 
SEPCO Sukkur  Electric Supply Company 
SO System Operator 
WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority 
 
REFERENCES 
Hart, O., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1997) The Proper Scope of Government: Theory 
and an Application to Prisons. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:4, 1127–
1161. 
Joskow, P. L. (1997) Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the US 
Electricity Sector. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 11:3,  119–138. 
Joskow, P. L. (2008) Incentive Regulation and Its Application to Electricity Networks. 
Review of Network Economics 7:4. 
Joskow, P. L. (2013) Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity 
Distribution and Transmission Networks. In Economic Regulation and Its Reform: 
What Have We Learned? University of Chicago Press. 
Joskow, P. L. and S. Richard (1983) Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electricity Utility 
Deregulation. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
528 Amir Jahan Khan 
Kahn, A. E. (1970, 1971) The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions. 
Volume 1 (1970) Volume 2 (1971). New York: Wiley. 
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Lyon, T. P. (1996) A Model of Sliding-scale Regulation. Journal of Regulatory 
Economics 9:3,  227–247. 
Malik, Afia (2007) Effectiveness of Regulatory Structure in the Power Sector of Pakistan. 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad. (Working Paper 25). 
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) (2004) Determination of Tariff 
in Respect of GEPCO, NEPRA/TRF-23/GEPCO-2003. 
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) (2010) State of Industry Report. 
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) (2011) State of Industry Report. 
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) Determination of the Authority 
in the Matter of Petition Filed by Gujranwala Electric Power Company Ltd. for 
Determination of its Consumer end Tariff Pertaining to the FY 2012-13. 
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) Determination of the Authority 
in the matter of Petition filed by GEPCO for determination of its Consumer end Tariff 
Pertaining to the FY 2011-12. 
Pakistan, Government of (2010) Economic Survey 2009-10. Islamabad: Pakistan Ministry 
of Finance. 
Pakistan, Government of (2013) The Causes and Impacts of Power Sector Circular Debt 
in Pakistan. Study Commissioned by Planning Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad. 
Schmalensee, R. (1989) Good Regulatory Regimes. Rand Journal of Economics 20:3, 
417–436. 
World Bank (2011) World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
  
 Structure and Regulation of the Electricity Networks  529 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments 
 
This paper is a valuable collection of information relating to the electricity 
network of Pakistan (especially in the light of theoretical justification); despite the 
fact that some (of courses not all) of the details documented here in this paper have 
repeatedly been discussed in the previous studies on the electricity sector of Pakistan. 
Overall it’s a well-written paper. The author has done a useful analysis on the 
distribution system in Section 2.  
It is true that economic incentives in lowering production costs are more important 
than enforcing the efficient pricing mechanism and can help in improving welfare for the 
society. This point is well documented in the literature and has been proved empirically. 
As efficiency has become a main concern in electricity networks, benchmarking analysis 
of company’s inefficiency levels is more frequently used as an instrument to monitor the 
companies and induce cost-saving incentives. Benchmarking can be used in many forms 
in regulatory arrangements. For instance, the efficiency estimates of different firms can 
be used to adjust their X-factor in price cap regulation to differentiate maximum prices 
across companies. At the same time benchmarking can also be used to reduce the 
information disadvantage of the regulator about companies’ expenditures. For instance, 
parametric frontier methods can be used to predict costs in order to assess if the reported 
company’s costs used in rate of return regulation are reasonable.35 
In Pakistan, despite the availability of empirical research on the benchmarking and 
regulation for the electricity distribution sector, regulator, unfortunately has not been able 
to set benchmarks for efficiency and performance of the distribution sector. It may be 
because either they don’t have the expertise or the authority to implement those 
decisions.  
As far as privatisation is concerned it is not the only solution to bring market 
efficiency and improve competition. As author has also pointed out that keeping the 
regulatory regime unchanged will result in an inefficient private monopoly instead of an 
inefficient public monopoly. It is also obvious from the case of KESC. There are 
countries like Norway with very efficient and competitive electricity markets without 
privatisation where better public participation through a corporate sector was a strong 
alternative. Therefore, complete corporate structure for all DISCOs; and tariffs for each 
DISCO based on its efficiency, is must for progress in the sector. 
The power system (though unbundled to a certain level) as an outcome of first 
generation reforms in the power sector has again become centralised under PEPCO which 
continues to hold influence (in financial management, power purchase and sales and in 
the appointment of senior management) over the operating companies (GENCOs and 
DISCOs). Further, these companies lack technical and managerial skills to operate 
independently. For instance, DISCOs besides having inferior operational performance, 
 
35
For details, see Farsi, et al. (2007) “Benchmarking and Regulation in the Electricity Distribution 
Sector”. CEPE Working Paper No. 54, ETH Zürich, Zurich, Switzerland.  
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are not aware about their role and need of good governance as a corporate entity. Despite 
being a corporate entity their attitude is still that of a public sector organisation. Unless 
all distribution companies in Pakistan are made accountable for all their decisions and 
finances, it would not be possible to bring in efficiency in the system. At present 
inefficient DISCOs like Quetta, Hyderabad, and Peshawar are being indirectly subsidised 
by some profit making DISCOs like Lahore, Islamabad, and Faisalabad. 
Lack of expertise in the form of financial and commercial skills is a serious 
impediment in the way of accountability, quick decision-making and commercial 
orientation, and it is applicable to not only the network operators but also to the regulator. 
All the issues can only be addressed if the management of energy sector becomes more 
professional and competitive. With improvement in managerial capacities they would be 
able to identify required investments and potential costs. 
Generally speaking, vested interests in the successive governments have stalled the 
due level of competence and commitment that are prerequisite for progress in the 
electricity sector. They not only lacked the capacity to foresee the emerging challenges 
but were also not able to respond in an efficient manner. As a result of these problems 
tariffs, investment and appointment of senior management and staff have largely been 
politicised. Therefore, improvement in the processes of decision making and 
implementation could be an important ingredient in working towards a fair and 
sustainable electricity sector.  
Professor Mohen Munasinghe in Allama Iqbal Lecture (in this Conference) very 
rightly pointed out that ownership does not matter whether its public or private what 
really matters is the government interference. The least the intervention the better it is.  
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